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THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND
RWANDA: GOALS AND RESULTS
Louise Arbour*

My ambition in this extraordinary venture deals with the workings of two ad hoc tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) and the creation of a permanent international criminal court. My ambition is to create a forum that will
draw from the best standards of criminal practice throughout the
world in order to apply the contributions of domestic judicial systems to the world environment. If successful, criminal justice could
eradicate the most outrageous violations of human rights.
In the field of international humanitarian law, some of the
most horrendous crimes have been committed with impunity
because of shortcomings in the domestic criminal justice systems.
However, since Nuremberg the domestic criminal law environment
has changed very dramatically. Changes in the length of domestic
trials and of ad hoc international criminal trials held in the Hague
testify to the vast difference in the legal environment since Nuremberg. Disclosure practices and standards are another notable difference since Nuremberg. I can assure you that in the ICTY and in
the ICTR we are now held to disclosure practices and standards
that were unknown even a decade ago. For example, we have to
turn over huge amounts of evidence including open source information which we have an obligation to translate and to make available
to the defense.
* Prosecutor International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; B.A.
College Regina Assumpta; L.L.L. Faculty of Law, University of Montreal; Doctorate of Laws
(Honoris Causa), York University 1995 and University of Ottawa.
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I would like to give you a very brief update on the health of the
ICTY and the ICTR ad hoc tribunals. I will emphasize the events
that took place in the last six months particularly in the summer of
1997. In the case of the ICTY, arrests took place in Eastern
Slovonia and in Prijador. In the case of the ICTR, an arrest took
place in Nairobi where all eight accused were apprehended. They
were not all accused at the same time. Some were apprehended
under a different procedure. Essentially these events of the last six
months have permanently dispelled any notion of the impotence of
these two institutions.
I can assure you that in my own office the mood has changed
considerably from what it was when I arrived last Fall. At that
time, the talk coming to us from the media was very often of doom
and doubt. The media questioned the very survival of these two
institutions. Now I do not hear many of the questions once raised
about the survival of the tribunals, and I am very encouraged by
that change.
In my view as a lawyer, the other event that is extremely significant is the legal initiative launched last January when we sought
the issuance of a subpoena to compel the production of documents
both from the Republic of Croatia and, personally, from its Minister of Defense. I believe this may be the single most important
issue that I will have to address in my term of office as Chief Prosecutor. The subpoena to compel documents was sought in the case
of the Prosecutor against General Tihomir Blaskic. This summer a
favorable decision was reached for the Prosecution by the trial
chambers. This matter is presently under appeal. This is an absolutely critical phase in the development of the ICTY. If I may use
the colorful image used by President Cassese in describing the Tribunal, which he called a giant without arms or legs, I am determined to do what I can to put these limbs in place.
We face difficulties with respect to the arrest of indictees. The
enormous, but less well known, difficulties we face are in accessing
the evidence upon which to convict indictees. Both these issues
have a direct link to the reliance of the two tribunals on State cooperation and to the inevitable limits imposed upon the Tribunals
because of this mode of operation. Although the mandate of the
Tribunals is to prosecute individuals on the basis of their personal
criminal liability, I think we must never lose sight of the fact that
the harm that the Tribunals are designed, in part, to address, is a
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harm that was perpetrated at the hands of the State either through
its collusion or through its impotence. This is the environment in
which these Tribunals currently operate.
I think it has now been demonstrated beyond a reasonable
doubt that States will always behave in what they perceive to be
their best self interest (rhetoric aside). What States say pales in
comparison to States' deeds, and their deeds are exclusively dictated by their perceived self interest. The difficulties that we have
encountered in having to rely essentially on State cooperation for
arrests and for access to evidence accounts for the vulnerability of
the Tribunals which are dependent on political interests. There is
only so much that can be done internally to minimize that dependency. However, I believe that it is essential for me, as a Prosecutor, to take every initiative to diminish that dependency and to
install the self-sufficiency of the Tribunals.
Recourse to sealed indictments was a clear step in the direction
of self-sufficiency of the Tribunals. We properly denounced the
unconscionable lack of support given to us from States and from
the broader international community. However, we should not
expect any better from the States because of their clear self interest
in not seeing criminal justice succeed. By not publicizing ahead of
time the existence of an indictment, we were able to marginally
improve the problem of State and international community cooperation. But sealed indictments can not do much for the indictments
that are already in the public domain.
It is a pretty simplistic proposition, but true and effective, that
an encounter leading to an apprehension will be somewhat facilitated if the target is unsuspecting of the possible intervention. It is a
basic principle of domestic criminal justice, and yet, it seems to be
perceived in the region as though we had launched a Star Chamber
operation of secret lists. I doubt that any domestic criminal justice
system would feel that it is appropriate to issue a televised warning
that an operation is imminent to arrest a suspect who has demonstrated an unwillingness to surrender.
The interests of criminal justice have been made sadly subservient to other very legitimate and laudable interests in the peace
building process in Bosnia. I believe that for many of the stakeholders in the Bosnian peace process (and here I exclude the victims of war crimes), criminal justice is a mere instrument that needs
to be coordinated with, and be subordinated to, other initiatives to
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rebuild democracy. It is absolutely clear in the minds of most of
these stakeholders (excluding the victims) that the necessity to hold
elections should triumph at all times and in all circumstances over
the progress of international criminal justice. I find it extraordinary
to claim a priority over means to achieve an end. It is also
extraordinary to claim that some means should be relinquished or
at least neglected. According to that principle very little progress
can be made with respect to the apprehension of war criminals. In
short, there is a notion that the process of criminal justice is a sort
of irritant to the peace process. This notion exists even in the minds
of those who, in some abstract way, believe that breaking the culture of impunity and bringing war criminals to justice is a good idea.
But for them it is never the right time or there are never the right
circumstances to bring war criminals to justice. The criminal justice
process itself is perceived as disturbing. In response to that I say:
"Welcome, to criminal justice." The unfolding of the domestic
criminal justice process IS very disturbing. It is profoundly disturbing to victims and witnesses who have to relive publicly a very
traumatic event, to have to submit themselves to brutal cross-examination and sometimes to ridicule. It is very disturbing to the victims and to their families when only some have survived. It is very
disturbing to social order which is very often rattled by the exposure of racial hatred at the underbelly of the society in which we
live. There has never been a claim that criminal justice, as it is
unfolding, is a peaceful and serene process. But we believe that
criminal justice is a long term investment, to achieve a peaceful
society. We have to go through the motions, painful as they are, if
we are going to utilize this mechanism of conflict resolution.
I find it personally appalling to suggest that the participation of
SFOR troops in arrests would jeopardize the fundamental operational principal of evenhandedness and that arrests should, therefore, yield to the higher imperative of the maintenance of the
peacekeeping operation. I find it appalling to suggest that arresting
a person, who happens to be of a particular gender or ethnic origin,
breaks the principal of evenhandedness. I think it is clear that
when SFOR performs an arrest, it takes sides. It takes the side of
justice, which is exactly where SFOR should be.
Relief from dependency of State cooperation will be achieved,
in part, by legal initiatives that we have launched. There is, however, no guarantee that we will be successful on each one of these
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initiatives, yet I believe that it is my duty to advance every plausible, credible, legal argument within my power to break the
unhealthy dependency on State cooperation. State cooperation will
continue to be the mode of operation of the Office of the Prosecutor with its numerous partners - international organizations,
NGOs, and governments - which are supportive not only in their
rhetoric but in their deeds, and without whom the Tribunal clearly
could not function. But one has to confront the limits of State
cooperation and to consider the legal means utilized to overcome
the lack of State cooperation.
It is also clear that legal initiatives are not the only mechanism
to resolve the lack of State cooperation. I can now testify to the fact
that we are crippled in our efforts to make progress toward voluntary surrender because of the prospects of very lengthy pre-trial
custody for the accused. If one were to consider a bargaining position for the Office of the Prosecutor with respect to voluntary surrender, there is virtually nothing to bargain for. The people whom
we want to arrest, or who should surrender, are extremely poor
candidates for bail. They are charged with the most heinous
offenses known to mankind. We have very little means of keeping
them on the kind of legal leash that a State normally has when it
puts a person under an order of pre-trial release. In virtually every
case I would have to be in court resisting bail applications, even
though each one is examined on a case by case basis.
Absent access to bail, the question of the length of pre-trial
detention is a very critical one. Until we have financial resources
that will allow us to move these cases through our court more expeditiously, the courtroom staff is depriving itself of a nonviolent
method of bringing the accused to trial, that is, by their voluntary
surrender. And I am hoping to be able .to persuade our institutional source of funding, the United Nations Budgetary Committee,
that better resources would facilitate the issue.
Let me say a few things about the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Many of the issues and legal initiatives that I
have highlighted here with respect to the ICTY apply to the ICTR
as well. For instance, even though it received very little attention,
the use of sealed indictments was a strategy that we also pursued in
the Rwanda Tribunal. The use of sealed indictments is a procedure
by which people are apprehended, and an indictment is brought
forward later. Of the people arrested in Nairobi, as I indicated
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before, some were arrested prior to indictment. But some of the
eight were actually indicted, and the indictment was kept under
seal. This was done because we were persuaded that if we had publicized the existence of the indictment after it was confirmed by a
judge, it would certainly have jeopardized our capacity to arrest the
accused. It would have completely rendered impossible the arrest
of their friends who would have been put on notice that an operation was underway. Therefore, we used exactly the same technique
in Rwanda as in Yugoslavia. Our success, if we achieve it in the
Chamber of Appeals, with respect to access to documents and testimonial evidence, will benefit both Tribunals.
The main problem, in the case of the Rwanda Tribunal, is to
break its isolation. Even within Africa the Tribunal's work is not as
well known as it should be. In fact, until the success of this summer,
the image of the Tribunal within Rwanda was just abysmal. There
was an enormous amount of difficulty in bringing the work of the
Tribunal to the attention of the people who have a primary interest
in seeing the Tribunal succeed. So isolation is clearly a big problem.
The second problem in the Rwanda Tribunal is staffing in the
Office of the Prosecutor. We still have an incredible vacancy rate.
It is caused, in part, by the fact that we are seeking professionals,
attorneys and investigators who can function with some fluency in
both French and English. For historical reasons, of course, most of
the victims and witnesses that we deal with, and the vast majority of
documents, and especially open source documents, are in French.
However, the environment in which we operate, the office environment and the interaction with the present government, is all in English. Thus, there is a real need for people who can function in both
languages. We are very severely understaffed because of the
impediment of language capabilities and the difficulty in recruiting
people to work in a very challenging environment. To a large
extent understaffing accounts for the slowpace of the legal process
with which I am still not satisfied. We relaunched an investigative
strategy that is now, in my view, much better targeted to prosecuting the accused in leadership positions. Moreover, we have
launched a much more vigorous attempt at prosecuting genderbased sexual violence.
The key policy that I intend to pursue at least in the short run
is to strengthen the links between the two Tribunals. I believe that
the need for better and stronger links will become more apparent
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when the Chamber of Appeals, which is joint to both Tribunals,
actually starts to perform its role. But until we get to that point, I
am determined to put into practice the obvious fact that we are
each other's best friends. Although these two Offices of the Prosecutor share a common Prosecutor, the staff of the two Tribunals is
very different. My staff for the Rwanda Tribunal is based in Kigali,
whereas the Yugoslav Tribunal staff is in the Hague. Nevertheless,
the issues which the two Tribunals face on a daily basis are common
to a large extent. We share the same goals, and are each other's
best resource.
Critical for the success of these two ad hoc Tribunals are those
issues that should be at the forefront of the minds of those who are
working towards a permanent international court. If and when we
have a treaty-based permanent international criminal court, we will
have experienced basically three models of international criminal
justice. First is the Nuremberg model, which I would now characterize by its potency as the trial of the victors. There were no questions about the empowerment of that Tribunal. It had the people it
was trying in custody. The Nuremberg Tribunal was working in a
potent environment and could certainly function in a very robust
fashion.
The ICTY and ICTR ad hoc Tribunals are at a considerably
lower level of potency then the Nuremberg Tribunal. However, the
ICTY and ICTR are potentially more robust then a treaty-based
court would be. That is something I think one ought to consider
very seriously. The ad hoc Tribunals were created under Chapter
Seven of the United Nations Charter as a subsidiary organ of the
Security Council. In terms of international institutions that is just
about as potent as you can be. Despite that power, look at how the
two ad hoc Tribunals are operating! After denouncing to the Security Council the lack of cooperation of some States, the Tribunal has
encountered a considerable amount of difficulty in overcoming that
lack of cooperation. So one has to be very aware of the limits of an
essentially consensus-based court, a court based on treaty. One has
to be aware of how such a court should arm itself in order to overcome the inevitable resistance to its successful operation and the
desire by the local community to undermine the operation of the
Tribunal when the State is actually called into play in a real case
environment.
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Another issue that is critical to the future of international justice is the recognition by the military of its ownership of international humanitarian law. International humanitarian law is military
law. I have had opportunities to say this, and I repeat it in every
environment in which I can get this message across to the military.
International humanitarian law is the law that distinguishes a soldier in action from the common murderer. When the military is
called upon to intervene in peace keeping operations in a post conflict environment in which war crimes are likely to have been committed, criminal justice should be the brokerage fee. The cost of
doing business with the military is a vigorous, relentless search and
apprehension of indicted war criminals. Until we get that kind of
culture engrained in the military, I believe that we will very often
face the difficulty that we face now with the implementation of
criminal justice. We would be in a very different legal environment
today if the SFOR operation had taken the position right from the
beginning that as soon as arrest warrants were issued they would be
immediately executed, one after the other. In part, I believe that
voluntary surrender would have become a considerably more
attractive option for many indictees than it is now. So the question
of penetrating military culture is absolutely critical.
The building of the legitimacy of criminal justice is also absolutely key. We take the legitimacy of criminal justice for granted in
our domestic setting, but it would be foolish to expect the legitimacy of criminal justice to be widely shared around the world.
There are many people who have to interface with international
criminal justice but who have never in their entire life been exposed
to a justice system in which they had confidence; or to a system that
is honest and not open to political interference or to corruption. It
is the daily experience of many people in this world that domestic
justice generally, including criminal justice, is very much in the
hands of political interest. Why should they believe me when I tell
them I am not biased. I am sure in this country most people have
experienced a criminal justice system that most of the time is
administered by people who are intelligent, well educated, not corrupt, and who act in good faith. And I believe that the reason that
we can have an efficient domestic criminal justice system is that
most people, including the accused, widely share in that assumption. Of course, there are always incidents of judicial misbehavior.
But there are institutions to deal with judicial misbehavior. Never-
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theless, the consensus is that the judicial system we deal with is fair.
However, we can not export that assumption. Therefore, the Tribunals have to be able to demonstrate, as we operate, that we are not
the mirror of the demented assumptions of ethnic cleansing. We
have to demonstrate that we, as an international institution, do not
have an agenda of punishing one group and favoring another. This
is an extremely challenging proposition to accept for those who
have lived all their lives surrounded by institutions which operate
on a very different basis.
In addition, the Tribunals have to overcome the fact that we
operate a criminal justice system in an environment that is profoundly lacking in one of the main pillars on which domestic criminal justice systems reside: a free media. The roots of the AngloSaxon model of criminal justice is that criminal justice is local. That
concept is at the heart of the jury system. Only in extraordinary
circumstances would courts grant a change of venue for a criminal
trial to be held in a different jurisdiction. However, the ICTY sits
in The Hague with respect to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. The ICTR sits in Arusha, Tanzania for crimes committed in
Rwanda. In view of the location of the Tribunals we have to be
able to bring criminal justice locally. You would think that with the
kind of information technology at our disposal this should be a very
easy task. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task. We live in an environment in which the work of the Tribunal is not portrayed locally
(where it should matter the most) through the intervention of a free
press and a free media. I think that in the case of the ICTY, it is
devastating for the work of the Office of the Prosecutor to have so
little input in the kind of information that is published and consumed domestically.
Finally, bench and bar ethics committees must be developed
locally where the ICTY and the ICTR sit. I am concerned about the
legislative power of these Tribunals. Currently, the rule-making
power is in the hands of the judges. Moreover, I am not sure that
there is a sufficiently broad-based consultation basis. For instance,
the defense has no input, no formal way of making a contribution in
the direction that the Tribunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure
could take. However, for those of us who believe that we come
from a very dominant legal culture, accommodating different legal
systems is a major challenge and contributes to the alienation of
many who are interfaced with the Tribunal. In addition, one has to
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grapple with the notion that the Tribunals are completely dominated by the Anglo-American common law system which has its
own idiosyncrasies that are not easily explainable to others. In conclusion, there are many legal issues that have to be resolved with
respect to the functioning of these Tribunals.

